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Abstract In this paper, a framework is developed to consider collective
action, sustainability and the capability approach with regard to resolution
of water disputes, followed by a brief discussion of how identity can hinder
cooperation or the development of universalism. This framework is then
examined with a case study of the Cauvery river dispute in India. At the
heart of river water disputes are issues related to justice and fairness,
which depend to a significant extent on: how citizens perceive their claims
over river water (shaped by cultural and historical factors); the extent to
which citizens are able to collectivize their claims through location,
economic activity and identity, and use their voice to influence the state;
the extent to which the state policy and actions reflect the ‘voice’ and
collective interests of different groups; and how the various riparian states
recognize and deal with each others’ claims. The framework discussed
here suggests that the capability approach provides us with a much
broader framework than collective action or Robert Solow’s sustainability
as inter-generational fairness. These are conjectures for further
exploration.
Key words: River waters, Collective action, Capability approach,
Sustainability, Conflict resolution
Introduction
Claims over natural resources are socially and institutionally conditioned.
A predominantly legal approach to such claims focuses on how property
rights are defined. The main mechanisms in the case of water are the land-
based rights to groundwater, and access-based rights such as ‘riparian’
rights to surface waters. However, since water is a fugitive resource, such
rights are either not fully developed or are incomplete. Therefore,
developing property rights is not a (Coasean) solution1 to river water
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disputes, which are a special case of conflicts.2 As in the case of inter-state
or civil conflicts, often there are a number of factors involving historical,
social, political and institutional aspects. At the heart of river water
disputes are issues related to justice and fairness. These depend to a
significant extent on: how citizens perceive their claims over river waters
(shaped by cultural and historical factors); the extent to which citizens are
able to collectivize their claims through location, economic activity and
identity, and use their voice to influence the state; the extent to which state
policy and actions reflect the ‘voice’ and collective interests of different
groups; and how the various riparian states recognize and deal with each
others’ claims.
This paper aims to develop a framework to consider river water
disputes from the view-points of collective action, sustainability, and the
capability approach, and to identify issues for policy. This framework is
then examined through the case study of the Cauvery river dispute in
southern India.3 Although I use an inter-state dispute, many of these
arguments may also apply to international water disputes. Following this
introduction, the next section summarizes the main elements of applying
the capability approach to access to water. In the third section a framework
is developed to consider sustainability and the capability approach in the
context of river waters, while the role of identity is discussed in the
subsequent section. The fifth section is devoted to the Cauvery case study,
followed by some conclusions in the final section.
Capability approach and access to water
In an economic approach to water policy, water — like any scarce
commodity — needs to be allocated on the basis of maximizing welfare or
utility. Decisions are based on comparing marginal benefits and costs of
allocating water to different uses. Benefits are usually assessed on the basis
of productivity (where water is an input to production) or willingness to
pay (where water is mainly for consumption). A number of problems and
limitations of such an approach are discussed in Amartya Sen’s Rationality
and Freedom (2002, pp. 553–575). An economic approach to water tends
to be dominated by instrumental and utilitarian values, and inter-temporal
allocations are biased in favour of present generation due to a positive
discount rate.
A commitment to sustainability as inter-generational fairness implies
that the use of natural resources (such as fresh water) to meet the needs of
the present population does not compromise the ability of future
generations to meet their needs. As Anand and Sen (2000) point out,
fairness here implies universalism to the extent that citizens of the present
generation and citizens of future generations, irrespective of race, gender,
and so forth, are treated in a similar manner. In practice, however,
sustainability is interpreted as a natural resource constraint on develop-
ment by imposing limits; for example, on how much water can be
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extracted or used. A potential problem in these approaches is that people
concerned are treated passively. On this, Sen points out:
it must be asked whether the conception of human beings
implicit in it is sufficiently capacious. Certainly, people have
‘needs’, but they also have values, and, in particular, they cherish
their ability to reason, appraise, act and participate. Seeing
people in terms only of their needs may give us a rather meagre
view of humanity. (Sen, 2004, p. 1)
Thus, there are three main messages concerning sustainability based
on the capability approach: to shift away from a focus on needs in the
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) definition
of sustainability to one that concerns ‘‘capabilities of people in the present
without compromising the capabilities of people in the future’’ (Sen,
2000); to recognize that universalism implies treating all human beings
equally, and therefore entails not just protecting the rights of future
generations but also an obligation to protect the rights of the poor within
the present generation (Anand and Sen, 2000); and this needs to be
achieved not through coercion, but by facilitating and enhancing the
substantive freedoms of individuals.
The capability approach to water requires a change in emphasis of
water policy from a commodity aspect of ‘how much water there is’ to
what functionings such water enables the individual to achieve.
Furthermore, ‘‘… in getting an idea of the well-being of the person, we
clearly have to move on to ‘functionings’, to wit, what the person succeeds
in doing with the commodities and characteristics at his command’’ (Sen,
1999a, p. 6; emphasis in original). An example may be considered, even at
risk of simplification. Access to water in the conventional approach to
water policy does not distinguish between an able-bodied or a disabled
person; both are treated similarly in terms of processes and privileges.
However, a disabled person may not be able to take advantage of such
water, or may need to depend on others even to exercise access.
There is potential to attract criticism that the capability approach is
about substantive freedoms and not about basic capabilities or particular
ingredients of quality of life. However, access to water, especially the issue
of river disputes, presents us with an opportunity to examine important
challenges to operationalizing the capability approach to sustainability.
First, there is the issue of resolving or balancing the exercise of well-being
freedoms of one group of users of water (say, an upstream state in the case
of a river, or farmers in the case of a lake) versus such freedoms of other
users (downstream users of a river or those who depend on a lake for
drinking water). Second, there is the issue of potential value conflict
between the exercise of well-being freedoms (mainly related to main-
tenance of basic capabilities of one group of users) and the exercise of
agency freedoms and ‘other-regarding’ preferences (where in the sense of
Kant’s injunction, such users have the obligation to protect the freedoms
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of more vulnerable users — such as downstream users or, for example,
other species or biodiversity dependent on the river). As Sen points out,
‘‘the use of socially responsible reasoning and of ideas of justice relates
closely to the centrality of individual freedom’’ (1999b, p. 261). Third is the
issue of how this moral responsibility can be extended to include
considerations about the well-being of the deprived and the poor in the
present, as well as the well-being of people, in the future.
While there can be intrinsic values of access to water (spiritual and
aesthetic values), the instrumental values are more directly relevant to
well-being freedoms such as being able to, for example:
N be free from thirst;
N clean oneself, or other members of the family or one’s livestock and
animals, or living environment (house, yard, or other belongings) for
health and enjoyment;
N appear in public without shame (clean clothes);
N be free from hunger (by using water to produce food-for-subsistence);
N travel, and transport personal belongings safely;
N use water creatively and produce food or other commodities of value to
others.4
The Millennium Development Goal of reducing by one-half the
proportion of population without access to improved sources of water and
basic sanitation recognizes the instrumental role of access to water in
guaranteeing some of the more substantial freedoms, including the right
to life and well-being of infants and children.5 This discussion suggests
that the capability approach to access to water requires us to address water
policy with a significant change in three dimensions, namely: changing
from viewing water as a commodity to focusing on the ability of individuals
to access and use water in achieving well-being freedoms (i.e. what
functionings the water enables individuals to do or achieve); recognizing
the scope for individuals to exercise agency freedoms in using their access
to water for the well-being of others (including, for example, those in
other parts of the world or those of future generations);6 and recognizing
the values that individuals place on freedom over and ability to influence
processes (personal as well as social or systemic) (see Sen, 2002, p. 624).
River water disputes — collective action, sustainability, and the
capability approach: a framework
Water disputes concern water resources that are public or common goods.
Resolving such disputes7 requires inter-dependent actions by more than
one party; that is, collective action (see Sandler, 1992; Anand, 2003). A
narrow definition of rationality would suggest that each agent would like
to use as much water as possible.8 In the absence of binding agreements,
upper riparians have an advantage that their use of river waters is not
dependent on actions of others. While their actions create an externality
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for downstream users, the latter cannot reciprocate except through
protest. Prior use doctrine has evolved mainly to protect the rights of
downstream users.
Collective action is, however, not costless. Mancur Olson’s (1965)
seminal analysis suggests that collective action will take place only if
benefits to the individual agents exceed costs to themselves. For the upper
riparian, the cost of participating in collective action is the water foregone
(and the attendant reduction in patronage that can be distributed). Based
on a narrow rationality, the lower riparians too would like to claim as
much of the river water as possible. The cost to them is the potential loss
of credibility of the claim (and the scope for entirely losing the riparian
right). The true costs and benefits are only known to the agents and are
difficult to assess. Hence, the difficulty in predicting when collective action
works — and when it does not work. Related to this is the question of
whether there is any issue linkage. Thus, whether or not two riparian
states will cooperate depends on whether the river is the only or main
transaction between them — if not, on whether there is any issue-linkage;
and if so, on whether the issues are considered in a compensating
framework or whether they are considered in isolation, each issue being
the subject of a different framework of agreement.
The discussion may be summarized with the help of a framework as
presented in Figure 1. An economic approach in each of the riparian states
tends to focus on item 1 in the top-left quadrant, or item 2 in the bottom-
left quadrant, of the diagram. Where collective action is facilitated or
mediated, it may produce some accommodation or cooperation (type B in
Fig. 1). However, this is still significantly within commodity aspects, and at
best concerns the well-being freedoms of people in the respective states;
moreover, there is little use of agency freedoms. Supposing that each of
the riparian states signs up to sustainability, such a commitment in the first
instance leads to a discussion about protecting the rights of future
generations, but it remains a ‘limited universalism’, since the basic
capabilities of the present generation of people in the downstream state
are not yet taken into consideration. However, when sustainability is
interpreted from the capability approach, the implicit commitment to a
broader universalism suggests that both type A and type B fairness issues
are simultaneously considered.
This can be technically developed using the following notation. For
simplicity, let us assume that a river is shared by two agents or states;
namely, an upstream (us) and a downstream (ds) state. In each state, there
are three main uses of river waters: a for agriculture and other productive
uses, d for domestic consumption and drinking water supply, and e for
environmental flows or protecting ecological functions. There are also just
two time periods, 1 being the present and 2 being the future.
The amount of water used by each state at present is given as:9
tus1 ~a
us
1 zd
us
1 ze
us
1 ð1Þ
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tds1 ~a
ds
1 zd
ds
1 ze
ds
1 ð2Þ
Based on narrow rationality, each state will try to maximize the amount of
water it can get. Inter-state river water dispute arises because the total
amount of water (T) available in the river:
T1vtus1 zt
ds
1 ð3Þ
Intra-state conflicts also can arise if the right-hand side in equations (1) and
(2) are in excess of the left hand side; that is, the amount of water (legally)
available in that state. A cost–benefit analysis-based approach would
allocate water to those uses that will maximize the benefits. However,
allocation of water to uses a, d, and e depends on institutions, laws,
knowledge, technology, history, and whether one group of users is more
organized (in the sense of Olson, 1965) than others to press for their
claims. In general, there is a danger that the use with least ‘voice’ tends to
be that of environmental flows or ecological functions (e).
Collective action framework (on the lines of Olson–Sandler–Barrett)10
encourages the two states to come to an agreement such that equation (3)
is reversed. In the negotiations, each state may use various justifications
why allocation to a, d, or e within their state needs to be increased, and as
a result why their total claim t must be increased. Integrated water
FIGURE 1. A framework to consider capability approach within the contexts of sustainability and
collective action.
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resources management (IWRM)11 is sometimes suggested as a solution
(see, for example, Biswas et al., 2004). However, in essence IWRM implies
that each use of water (a, d, and e) is given equal importance (not in terms
of quantity, but in terms of consideration in planning); and that water is
allocated to uses that maximize the net benefits, irrespective of whether
they are in an upstream state or a downstream state. However, in the
absence of coercion, IWRM is possible only if there is high degree of
cooperation between the two riparians. When there is a water dispute,
IWRM can at best be a distant goal and moreover it is not clear whether it
can guarantee sustainability requirements.
If, either through mediation efforts by outsiders or engagement by
various stakeholders within each state, a climate is created for cooperative
outcome, each state may recognize the need to go beyond narrow
rationality. The needs of the poorest in the other state may now be given
(some) importance in allocation decisions. (This commitment to fairness
is broadly indicated by the arrow marked ‘B’ in Figure 1.)
A commitment to the principle of sustainability requires each state to
decide how they balance the needs of the present versus those of the
future. Sustainability can have four alternative interpretations: First,
sustainability as inter-temporal optimization implies choosing the water
allocation decision that produces maximum present value of net benefits.
Thus in each state, water allocations are based on:
f a, d, eð Þ?Max B1{C1ð Þz B2{C2ð Þ= 1zrð Þð Þ½  ð4Þ
where B are estimated benefits, C are costs and r is the rate of time
preference (discount rate). Many limitations of this approach are discussed
in Sen (2002).
A second interpretation of sustainability is to leave the world as we
inherited it. In our model, this means that allocations to different uses are
maintained without any change.
t1 a, d, eð Þ~t2 a, d, eð Þ ð5Þ
However, with improved technology, agriculture, for example, may in
future require less water than at present; or, with improved knowledge
and understanding, future citizens may realize that allocation for
environmental flows needs to be increased.
A third interpretation of sustainability by Solow (1992) takes these
issues into account, according to which sustainability is a general and not a
specific obligation that leaves future generations as well off as the present
generation. Thus, for each state, Solow’s approach in essence means
protecting the ability of future generations to use river water as they
please:
t1&t2 ð6Þ
Solow does recognize that if there is reason to protect specific aspects of
the environment, it should be possible to do so.12 For example, while
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details of allocations to a and d are left to each generation, we may decide
to protect e:
t1 eð Þ&t2 eð Þ ð7Þ
These above three interpretations of sustainability encourage each
decision-maker (i.e. state) to think about future generations, but they do
not help resolve the issue of fairness in present allocation. Therefore, it is
possible that each state is committed to sustainability, but this does not
necessarily help resolve the current river water dispute.
A fourth interpretation of sustainability arises from the broad
universalism inherent in capability approach (following Anand and Sen,
2000; Sen, 2000). Thus, each decision-maker focuses on expanding
substantive freedoms and what functionings the water available makes
possible, rather than on quantities of water. In so doing, the expanded
agency-freedoms also come with Kantian responsibilities. Therefore,
allocation functions should be interpreted as:
f aus1 , d
us
1 , e
us
1
 
&f ads1 , d
ds
1 , e
ds
1
 
, aus2 , d
us
2 , e
us
2
   ð8aÞ
f ads1 , d
ds
1 , e
ds
1
 
&f aus1 , d
us
1 , e
us
1
 
, ads2 , d
ds
2 , e
ds
2
   ð8bÞ
In this approach, each state takes into account not only the needs of the
future in that state, but the current needs of (poor) people in the other
state. From this discussion, the following important points can be
identified:
a. Collective action is mainly useful in producing cooperative outcomes
that meet the needs of the present population in the two states, but it
cannot guarantee sustainability and fairness for future generations (as
they cannot participate in collective action).
b. Sustainability is mainly useful in highlighting the needs of future
generations and protecting inter-generational fairness, but it cannot
help resolve the tension between the needs of the present generation
versus the needs of future generations.
c. The capability approach appears to enable us go beyond these two
aspects, and use fairness and justice broadly. A strict interpretation
suggests that, given the universalism of a commitment to fairness
inherent in the capability approach, the needs of the poor or
vulnerable (whether human or non-human), and whether of present
or future generations, will be protected without requiring a separate
commitment to sustainability.
While this framework has been developed mainly at the level of states,
we can extend each of the three aspects to understand how individual
citizens interact, and whether their well-being is improved and
sustained.13
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The role of identity in river water disputes
River water disputes are seldom only about water. Usually, such disputes
and disagreements arise because of historic, political, geographic, and
economic reasons. In this section, some examples are discussed regarding
how identity becomes embedded in water discourses, followed by
examining the implications for considering identity within a capability
approach.
A limited interpretation of identity
The literature on identity is vast and spans disciplines such as psychology,
sociology, philosophy and economics. Is identity a scalar? If so, is it a
category variable or a continuous variable? Alternatively, is identity a
vector? Or is it a combination of scalars and vectors?14 Much use of the
term identity pertains to its use as a noun, as a qualitative and
unambiguous descriptor of an individual. This description seems to use
identity as a scalar, a binary or polychotomous category variable. For
example, in econometric models, aspects of identity are usually captured
as dummy variables: gender (male or female); ethnicity (Hutu or Tutsi),
community (Hindu or Muslim). For example, following Daniel McFadden
(1999), within the neoclassical model of rational behaviour, it is possible
to consider identity as a source of values that in turn influence
preferences. In the discourses within sociology, political science, and
participation literature, it is recognized that identity is not ‘given’, but
something that is actively constructed or shaped by the inter-play of
motivations, vested interests, and contexts.15
There are several ways in which identity can influence river water
disputes. The first is where a river is a direct source or an ingredient of
identity reflecting a historical affiliation, and ‘prior use’ rights due to
location. We need look no further than the roots of expressions such as
‘Indian’ (person of land of Indus river) or the Punjab (the land of five
rivers).
Through literature, metaphors, fables, and poetry, certain uses of
waters can be given more prominence than others. For example, in many
countries, including in India, a significant share of freshwater is allocated
to agricultural use.16 This is legitimized as a ‘good thing’, because it is
(supposedly) about food security, ending hunger, keeping the land green
(‘subhiksha’) and in general fostering prosperity. On the other hand, the
process of building dams to transport water to large cities is usually
portrayed as a ‘bad thing’. If cultivation of two crops of rice is constructed
as an essential ingredient of the identity of a certain people, the identity
itself then becomes the justification to grow two crops of rice. If natural or
human-induced water shortages interfere with the possibility of growing
two crops, such interference is seen as a threat to identity. This can
interfere with exercise of reason and economic rationality in examining
Capability, Sustainability, and Collective Action
117
farming as an economic activity in the context of scarce resources and
considerable uncertainty (e.g. in rainfall patterns).
A third way in which river waters and identity become inter-connected
is in shaping or influencing discourses concerning water itself. Much of the
‘discourse’ on water resources in India (and elsewhere) assumes a
‘masculine’ perspective, while rivers are usually represented as ‘feminine’
entities. A masculine perspective to control rivers and water resources is
not a new or recent phenomenon.17 A product of this masculinity is the
paradigm of ‘taming the rivers’ to control, contain, and restore order, and
to create certainty. Many irrigation projects designed and executed by the
British in India during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were
conceived within this paradigm, and there has been little change even after
Indian independence in 1947.18 With time, the metaphor of ‘taming of
waters’ was replaced by other more nuanced metaphors; but the
underlying bias towards large and multi-purpose projects remains
unchanged (see Singh, 1998). This is reflected in the following section
from paragraph 1.8 in India’s National Water Policy of 1987:
Water is one of the most crucial elements in developmental
planning. As the country prepares itself to enter the 21st century,
efforts to develop, conserve, utilise and manage this important
resource have to be guided by national perspectives. The need for
a national water policy is thus abundantly clear: water is a scarce
and precious national resource to be planned, developed and
conserved as such, and on an integrated and environmentally
sound basis, keeping in view the needs of the States concerned.
(Government of India, 1987; emphasis added)
The above paragraph has been retained intact in section 1.4 of India’s
National Water Policy of 2002. While the latter recognizes the need for a
paradigm change from ‘‘the present emphasis on the creation and
expansion of water resource infrastructures for diverse uses, … (to)
emphasis on the improvement of the performance of the existing water
resources facilities’’ (Government of India, 2002, paragraph 22), over-
whelming emphasis on projects, however, remains unchanged. For
example, the word ‘project’ appears at least 40 times in the 2002 policy
document. In this context, while identity is invoked as an overt instrument
of participation, an appeal is made to the individual to use her/his
‘freedom to act’ to show solidarity by participating in the process of
collective claims (e.g. protests or violence); such participation is defined in
a binary manner (‘either you are with us or against us’) such that the
individual’s freedom to choose is substantially restricted.
Going back to the framework discussed in the previous section,
identity in the above examples acts in the opposite direction to collective
action (arrow B in Fig. 1). Identity may not significantly affect sustainability
considerations within a state, but it can hinder such sustainability
considerations when the ecological benefits are mainly in the other state.
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In this sense, identity can reinforce existing ‘horizontal inequalities’ or
foster new ones (Stewart, 2001). In the language of social capital, identity
in the interpretations above tends to work mainly toward ‘bonding’ social
capital.
A broader interpretation of identity
Sen notes that ‘‘capabilities of persons to lead the kind of lives they value
— and have reason to value’’ can be enhanced by public policy, and also
that public policy can be influenced by the effective use of participatory
capabilities by the public (Sen, 1999b, p. 18). Furthermore, Sen highlights
that having greater freedom to do things one values is significant in itself
and also important in fostering the person’s opportunity to have valuable
outcomes. The agency aspect is highlighted here and there is an important
tension. A focus on justice requires that institutions are designed to
disregard differences and treat individuals equally. Identity, on the other
hand, focuses on attributes that are unique to each individual and thus
focuses on the difference. As Fraser (1996) points out, it is not a choice
between these two aspects, but how we could create a ‘bivalent’
conception of justice that focuses on both redistribution as well as
recognition aspects.
Sen (1999c) emphasizes that an individual can have multiple
identities simultaneously, why we need to place reason before identity,
and how collective action based on certain aspects of identity can lead to
disastrous outcomes, such as communal riots. The concept of plurality of
identities is also recognized in sociological and cultural studies, where
identity is seen both as a product of discourse and a subject of discourse
itself. As Hall notes, ‘‘precisely because identities are constructed within,
not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in
specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive forma-
tions and practices, by specific enunciative strategies’’ (2000, p. 17).19
A number of important points related to identity need to be
summarized before we examine the link between identity and capabilities:
(a) Identity has an individual aspect20 (how I perceive myself) and a
‘socially grounded’ aspect (how others perceive me). Some aspects of
this identity are binary or polychotomous variables; others are
continuous variables. It is also possible that some of these are vectors
(having both direction or inclination and intensity).
(b) How these different aspects of identity are processed by the individual
concerned allowing some of these to influence preferences (e.g. in
voting or contribution to public good or common problems), or in
evaluation, is a complex process. While it is clear why we need to
place reason before identity, to operationalize this we need a deeper
understanding of how identity influences individual agency or
perception of ‘significant others’ and the development of co-agency
or ‘fellowship’21 and engagement in collective action. While it is
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possible that various identities are available to an individual, whether
the individual has the agency freedoms to evaluate and choose
particular identities is determined by social, cultural, and political
aspects. The importance of this ‘freedom to act’ versus ‘freedom to
achieve’ is recognized in the Arrow Lectures by Sen: ‘‘… in assessing a
person’s freedom in this perspective, the concentration has to be on
what a person is free — and permitted — to do, and not on what she
manages to achieve’’ (2002, p. 597).
In this light, identity can significantly determine why a person values a
kind of life, and comes to value or have reason to value some things (or
functionings). Going back to the framework discussed in the previous
section, identity interpreted in this sense reinforces the commitment to
broader universalism even while the peculiarities are recognized and
embraced. In the language of social capital, identity interpreted in
this sense helps to develop both bonding and (mainly) bridging social
capital.
Identity, sustainability, and capability approach: an
examination of the Cauvery dispute
The Cauvery dispute in India is a typical inter-state dispute in a federal
context.22 This dispute between the two main riparian states of Tamil
Nadu and Karnataka goes back to contested claims based on specific
interpretations of riparian rights.23
The main arguments
While the Cauvery dispute is fairly complex, in this section an attempt is
made to summarize the main view-points of each of the two main riparian
states.
The main arguments of Karnataka
The main arguments are presented by each state to the Cauvery Tribunal,
and are not in the public domain. However, from the material that is
available in the public domain, mainly a set of three volumes published by
the government of Karnataka,24 and from the statements made by state
political leaders and reported in the newspapers, the following five main
points can be identified.
First, Karnataka’s claim is that, at the end of 50-year period in 1974,
the 1924 agreement in its entirety should be deemed to have expired.
Therefore, claims based on that agreement should not determine current
allocation of waters. According to Karnataka, the 1924 agreement was
made at a time when Tamil Nadu was under British rule and Karnataka was
under Maharaja’s administration when Karnataka did not have the
freedom to argue strongly to put forth its interests.
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Second, in Karnataka’s view, the farmers in the upstream areas have as
much right to irrigate and grow crops as do farmers in the downstream
areas. Karnataka’s claim is that the so-called prescriptive rights of
downstream farmers were protected by the British administration, which
could use its authority and powers to extract more waters for downstream
needs than would normally be the case.
Third, it is argued that Karnataka is mainly dependent on the South
West monsoon (June–September) that contributes significantly to the flow
of river Cauvery. On the other hand, it is argued that while Tamil Nadu is
pressing for claims, it also benefits from a significant amount of rain from
the North East monsoon (October–December), which it does not have to
share with other states. It is suggested that a claim on Cauvery waters
ignores this unequal distribution of rainfall and the resulting runoff.
Fourth, it is argued that a downstream state cannot make a claim
when there is scarcity of water and inadequacy in upstream areas. Thus, it
is argued that Karnataka can discharge waters to Tamil Nadu only if there
is adequate quantity of water to meet Karnataka’s needs. In recent years,
this has been an important issue with regard to implementing the flow
pattern as stipulated in the interim award of the Tribunal. The
Government of Karnataka finds itself in a difficult position to release
waters to Tamil Nadu when its own farmers face acute water shortages,
occasionally leading to suicides.25 The government of Karnataka is thus
pushed into a tight corner whereby implementing the Tribunal’s award in
terms of flows in summer months is perceived by local farmers as denying
them water.
Fifth, Karnataka argues that riparian rights need to be reconsidered,
such that the share of river water is in proportion to the basin area and
contribution to river flow. For example, according to the Government of
Karnataka (n.d., p. 10), the extent of Cauvery basin area and yield
contribution are as presented in Table 1.
The argument is that Karnataka’s claims over Cauvery waters must be
related to its contribution to Cauvery flow and also its needs in terms of
drought prone area in the basin.
Table 1. Cauvery basin area and yield contribution by different riparian states according to
Government of Karnataka (n.d., p. 10)
Karnataka Tamil Nadu Kerala Pondichery
Basin area in square
kilometres (% of total basin
area)
34 273 (42.2%) 43 868 (54.3%) 2866 (3.5%) 148
Drought area in the basin in
square kilometres (% of
basin area in the state)
21 870 (63.8%) 12 790 (29.2%) – –
Contribution to water in the
river in TMC feet
425 (53.8%) 252 (31.9%) 113 (14.3%)
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The main arguments of Tamil Nadu
In the case of Tamil Nadu, there is no published information from the
government in the public domain to gauge the government’s stance.
However, on the basis of reported items in the newspaper media, and
occasional statements in the Policy Notes in the State Legislature, the
following points can be identified.
According to Tamil Nadu, the 1924 agreement is foundational to the
development of key projects in both the states and therefore cannot now
be changed, as any such change would have significant detrimental effects.
In Tamil Nadu’s view it appears that the provision of review at the end of
50 years relates to various arrangements for implementing the agreement,
rather than changing the core principles of the agreement itself.
Second, the long history of farmers in Cauvery delta irrigation and
producing rice should not be denied. As the 1924 agreement recognized
these prescriptive rights, these need to be protected. Farmers in Karnataka
are not denied the use of the waters but there is a limit on water volume
and area to be irrigated so that downstream users’ rights are not
jeopardized.
Third, monsoon features are natural factors based on which claims
cannot be made. These monsoon patterns existed long before river water-
sharing agreements came into force. The main point seems to be that
Karnataka is free to exploit the South West monsoon or other sources so
long as the flow of water in Cauvery is guaranteed, such that the
downstream farmers’ prescriptive right is not negatively affected.
Fourth, an inter-state river is common and not private property of the
upstream state. Hence, it cannot be argued that, after the needs of one
state are met, only excess waters, if any, will be released.
Fifthly, Tamil Nadu seems to recognize that the basin area,
contribution to river flow and other factors can be taken into account.
However, this needs to be applied to distribution of waters beyond those
needed to meet the prescriptive rights of downstream farmers.
Analysis and issues in applying the capability approach
River water disputes are presented by political parties to connect river
water claims to identity, and thereby enhance their own legitimacy as
protectors of the rights of people. In each state, there is political
competition to create support bases; thus there are forces that try and
use various aspects of identity such as gender, caste, and occupation.
Some parties try to appeal to the ‘vertical’ forces of identity (all voters
belonging to a particular caste irrespective of class), others try to use
‘horizontal’ forces of identity (language or religion) that cut across
different castes. River water disputes provide political parties with the
opportunity to use the horizontal dimension to emphasize one aspect of
identity over other aspects to gain votes. Identity seems to force the
political parties to interpret rationality narrowly. At present, the legal
approach to dispute resolution focuses mainly on claims over quantity of
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water by each state, and this creates ‘perverse’ incentives for each state to
ignore the common property or public good dimension, and to treat the
water as a private good. Therefore, in terms of the framework developed in
the third section, the legal approach militates against the possibility of
cooperation.
The claims mainly focus on the use of water for irrigation purposes.
Based on the data for the period 1934–1972, Sanjivi Guhan (1993)
reported that the total annual yield of water from Cauvery was 670 TMCft
at 75 per cent dependability and 740 TMCft at 50 per cent dependability.26
The claims made by the four riparian states together stand at about 1150
TMCft (and thus exceed the total flow in the river as expressed in
equation (3). A majority of these claims are for irrigation purposes, while
industrial and drinking water supply requirements are estimated to be less
than 100 TMCft. Currently, there is little discussion about environmental
flows or ecological functions. Thus, there is hardly any use of the
sustainability principle.
The analysis so far may be summarized as follows:
(a) From human development and other macro-indicators, the two
riparian states are not significantly different, although they have
distinct languages and traditions. This may have played a role in
facilitating the discourses of identity creation. For example, different
languages mean that there is some degree of monopoly by news-
papers or other media (such as television networks) depending on
where they are based, even if English-language dailies make an
attempt to be less parochial than vernacular media. As briefly
discussed by K. T. Appiah (2001), just as state institutions can shape
identity, media can have an influence. As in the case of communal
riots (see Varshney, 2004), in the case of inter-state or international
conflicts, the development of inter-ethnic or inter-group institutions
may be crucial to the development of trust. Such trust formation may
be crucial to questioning and de-constructing perceptions about
identity of the other.
(b) The electoral analysis in P. B. Anand (2004b) suggests that winning a
majority of seats in the constituencies in Cauvery basin districts is
crucial to government formation in both Karntaka and Tamil Nadu, no
matter which particular coalition ultimately manages to form the
government. This seems to prevent respective state governments from
‘yielding’ any concessions to the ‘other’.
(c) Moreover, while ecological functions are important, it has also been
noticed during my fieldwork that paddy cultivation continues all the
way from the highlands in Coorg to Cauvery Delta districts.
Discussions indicate that cultivation of paddy in the highlands is a
recent phenomenon. Three plausible explanations can be considered:
that upland farmers are diversifying into paddy cultivation as coffee
prices remain low; that while plantations remain the main crop of
large farmers, small farmers find subsistence farming of rice as the
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most viable survival strategy; and that there is political encouragement
to ‘question history’ and grow paddy because the prescriptive right of
downstream farmers was a similar human construct.
There are several important messages from the capability approach
for resolving river water or other natural-resource-based conflicts, four of
which are highlighted here.
First, rather than focusing on goods or natural resources or property
rights to command them, a capability approach requires us to examine
what these goods do to people; what functionings can be achieved; and
how these alternative functionings are valued.
Second, we need to examine and evaluate the way in which identity is
constructed, portrayed or interpreted, and how these processes can
significantly influence the arguments about command over natural
resources. As Sen notes in his first Tanner lecture: ‘‘If human beings were
very like each other, this would not have mattered a great deal, but there is
evidence that the conversion of goods to capabilities varies from person to
person substantially, and the equality of the former may still be far from
the equality of the latter’’ (Sen, 1979, p. 219). Identity, and an under-
standing of the processes that influence it, can have a significant influence
on many of the dimensions relating to substantive well-being freedoms, as
well as their exercise of the agency freedoms. Identity can enter the
decision calculus as a variable indirectly through endowments, which may
in turn limit the range of functionings that individuals belonging to certain
social groups can achieve. Alternatively, it can also influence the process of
preference formation and agency.
Third, it can be argued that adapting the capability approach helps
societies or groups of people in a society to evaluate different constitutive
elements of identity and help them in placing ‘reason before identity’ (see
Sen, 1999c). Collective action is used in resolving disputes and conflicts
rather than in prolonging them. Institutions that facilitate information
sharing and the process aspect of freedoms and transparency guarantees
are related to this.
Fourth, it can be argued that, as an approach that focuses on how
substantive freedoms enable individuals to participate in, and contribute
to, socially enhancing such freedoms, the capability approach helps us to
examine individual and collective capabilities, as well as whether identity
imposes restrictions on some groups of people in the society, and thus
embeds inequality. For example, riparian rights are not socially indis-
criminant. A number of studies suggest that lush green fields and parched
throats do co-exist (see Bhatia, 1992; Shiva, 2002). As already noted, much
discussion on river water disputes focuses on states as though they were
rational individuals. The relationship between preferences of individual
citizens and the state policy is left to public choice or political economy
models. The capability approach enables us to examine the link between
substantive freedoms at the individual level and how these contribute to
collective action.
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Four specific examples may illustrate how the above may be
operationalized.
Enhancing freedoms
The main emphasis of a capability approach is to enhance substantive
freedoms. In the context of river water disputes, this could include
consideration of rights and promotion of discussion and dialogue about
functionings that can be actually achieved. Sen reminds us of the potential
conflict ‘‘… between (1) having less inequality of freedoms and (2) getting
as much freedom as possible for all, irrespective of inequalities’’ (1999b,
p. 285). The capability approach to water is necessarily concerned with
both ‘aggregative and distributive’ issues, and these need to be addressed
not through the use of a technocratic formula, but within a participatory
process. This is not a glib acknowledgement of participation, but a
requirement that water policy (or, for that matter, any public policy) is
essentially about freedoms. People are treated as free agents capable of
rational decision-making, where such rationality includes other-regarding
preferences and a commitment to fairness. With regard to rights, it is
important to note that while rights may be helpful means to promoting
and guaranteeing freedoms, they are not ends in themselves. There is
some discussion concerning right to water, but this discussion needs to be
expanded and embedded within the broader universalism in the capability
approach.
Promoting a dialogue about sustainability
As mentioned in the third section of this paper, a strong interpretation of
the capability approach suggests that a separate commitment to sustain-
ability may not be necessary. However, in the transition to such an
interpretation, discussion about specific environmental issues may be
helpful in expanding informational basis and reminding us of our Kantian
responsibilities associated with the freedoms. Anand and Sen (2000)
suggest that dialogue and discussion of important environmental issues
can contribute to a shift in the basis of values toward broader universalism.
While the main emphasis in sustainability tends to be mainly towards
intrinsic values and the rights of future generations, the capability
approach can help in broadening the universalism to include both human
as well non-human values.
Embedding policy within participation and process freedoms
At present, the legal approach recognizes only the governments of the
disputant states as legitimate parties in the case of a river water dispute.
Citizens cannot directly participate or know about the proceedings of the
tribunals. They can only express their view-points through collective
action (mobilizing an interest group) or ‘voice’ through media. Enabling
participation of people and the citizens of co-riparians to exchange their
view-points and arguments more openly, and debate about issues, is a
crucial element.
Capability, Sustainability, and Collective Action
125
Enhancing possibilities of cooperation
Studies of ethnic and communal violence suggest that people who have
lived for many years as friends or neighbours can suddenly become
engulfed in ethnic hatred (see Varshney, 2004; Bardhan, 2004, chapter 9).
Varshney’s observation highlights the importance of inter-ethnic civic
organization in minimizing such conflicts or avoiding bloodshed.
Currently, the dispute is orchestrated mainly by the state governments.
Promoting opportunities for the development of ‘bridging social capital’
and dialogue is crucial. There is a role for public argumentation and
deliberation and also the promotion of democratic citizenship in
education and curricula. Making available Tamil and Kannada languages
as options in school education in both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu states
can also go some way towards bridging the ‘distance’.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to examine river water disputes as a special case
related to sustainability. The framework developed here highlights the
potential contribution that the capability approach can make in improving
our understanding of the ethical concerns at the core of such issues related
to sustainability.
At present, much discussion on water disputes tends to be mainly
based on economic approaches, clarifying property rights or the legal
approach to setting out dispute resolution mechanisms in the form of
tribunals or river authorities. There has also been considerable discussion
on the so-called integrated river basin management. The main weakness in
these approaches is that they approach water policy mainly from a
commodity perspective, thus neglecting the human and social dimensions.
Water disputes are not merely over commodities or squabbles over
imperfect property rights, but are closely linked to aspects of justice and
fairness. While sustainability and collective action approaches suggest that
rationality can be broadly interpreted to include other regarding
preferences, identity tends to be used to work in the opposite direction
and to use considerations of security to restrict preferences to ‘self-
interest’.
In as much as individuals have multiple identities, some of which are
relevant to claims over natural resources, it is possible to broaden the
definition of identity such that reason and other regarding preferences are
not excluded. Within the capability approach and expansion of freedoms,
participation and collective action possibilities can help in expanding the
informational basis of policy choices. The capability approach also
requires that the expanded freedoms come with Kantian responsibilities,
such that a pursuit of freedoms is concomitant with pursuit of
sustainability as commitment to fairness and universalism.
However, the recommendation to use the capability approach has
some limitations. First, the emphasis on increasing substantive freedoms
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requires a social and collective process to pursue the creation of such
freedoms. A policy-maker concerned with, say, water resources may argue
that their responsibility is limited to water resources and increasing
substantive freedoms is someone else’s responsibility. However, a water
utility that embraces the ethos of participation is more likely to take its
service obligations seriously and use resources available at its command to
meet them. As I have argued elsewhere, the capability approach is likely to
be more effective than a right to water (Anand, 2006b). Secondly, a strong
interpretation of the capability approach (and thus, a commitment to
universalism) suggests that a separate commitment to sustainability may
not be necessary. However, a deep ecology perspective and an environ-
mental ethic may help citizens to remind themselves of their commitments
or of their Kantian responsibilities. From this perspective, the capability
approach can be misunderstood to be mainly concerned with human
development, and thus essentially anthropocentric. However, the uni-
versalism inherent in the capability approach is far from anthropocentric.
Thirdly, to the extent that capabilities are determined by institutions,
identity may limit the opportunities available to an individual. Even as an
individual has multiple identities, the opportunity set of one’s identities
and the freedom to choose an identity can be severely restricted by
institutional mechanisms. Also, an individual may not even be aware of
various identities available to him/her and of the fact that she/he has the
freedom to choose. These features of identity make it a fertile ground for
political manipulation, more so when it can be linked to inadequately
defined and difficult to enforce common property resources.
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Notes
1 Following Ronald Coase’s theorem concerning the role of property rights (Coase,
1960).
2 Interaction between two riparian states can range from political union (perfect
cooperation) at one extreme to outright war (pure conflict) at the other extreme.
However, as Wolf et al. (2003) observe, in most cases, contested claims over waters
seldom lead to armed conflicts. However, the expression ‘water wars’ remains
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attractive to some journalists and researchers; examples include Ohlsson (1995),
Homer-Dixon (1998), de Villiers (1999), and Swain (2000). Others argue that, in the
context of water, more important than the traditional wars are the so-called ‘paradigm
wars’; that is, conflicts of view-points, of institutions and norms (Shiva, 2002).
3 Cauvery is a perennial river in south India originating in the Western Ghats and flowing
eastwards into the Bay of Bengal. It is approximately 800 km long and drains a basin of
area of about 75 000 square km.
4 This last item partly includes an agency-freedom (i.e. going well beyond one’s own
well-being; see Sen, 1985).
5 See Anand (2006a), where regression analysis based on cross-country data clearly
indicates the link between improving access to water and access to sanitation and
reducing the infant mortality rate.
6 This relates to sustainability (see Anand and Sen, 2000).
7 Although the focus of this paper is on river water disputes, this is a special case of
contested claims over natural resources. Much of the analysis here is also relevant to,
for example, trans-boundary issues of forest and biodiversity conservation, pollution
control, and control of communicable diseases.
8 This can be considered a prisoner’s dilemma problem. As the decision has to be made
simultaneously and commitments (promises) of the other agent cannot be enforced,
each agent ends up making decisions purely on the basis of private benefits or costs,
although both know that the cooperative outcome is superior (see Dixit and Nalebuff,
1991; Schick, 1997). Alternatively, this can be considered a case of externality. Thus,
there is divergence between marginal social costs and marginal private costs, but each
agent may end up choosing to use too much water than is socially desirable (see
Barrett, 1994; Anand, 2004a).
9 Two important points need to be noted here. First, although in all the equations I
mainly talk about quantity, it is recognized that quality of water is equally important.
The assumption here is that any use of (remaining) water that is returned to the river
meets with environmental quality standards such that quality of water in the river is not
irreversibly changed. Second, although we are assuming that each state recognizes and
protects allocation for the environmental flows, in reality it is quite possible that
increased allocations to a and d result in diverting water away from e.
10 Sandler (1992) develops more formally various issues related to collective action,
building in some respects on Olson (1965). Barrett (1994) focuses on a different aspect
of collective action, namely self-enforcing agreement.
11 The IWRM approach can be expressed as the requirement that: T5(aus+ads)+
(dus+dds)+(eus+eds).
12 It is possible to apply the so-called ‘strong sustainability’ principle, which applies
sustainability constraint to each of the uses a, d, and e.
13 See Bardhan (1995, 2000, 2004) for discussion on collective action for irrigation.
14 It is quite possible that, where individuals have the freedoms, they may be processing
these various combinations but choosing specific aspects of identity suitable to given
contexts. A teacher in one school may attend Parent–Teacher Association meetings as a
parent at the school where his/her children are studying. In modelling terms, the
individual may be using both scalars and vectors.
15 See, for example, Fraser (1996), Hall (2000), Woodward (2002), and Bardhan (2004).
16 Globally, it is estimated that 70 per cent of all water diverted for human use is used for
agriculture. See Rijsberman (2004, p. 500).
17 According to one of the Hindu epics, Ganges was brought down from the heavens at
the request of Bhagiratha to wash the sins of his forefathers. However, bringing Ganges
down to earth would not have been possible had it not been for Lord Shiva agreeing to
use the locks of hair on his head to cushion the enormous kinetic energy of the Ganges
gushing from the heavens to the earth, so that it is released slowly. The parallel
between this and the modern engineering approach to irrigation and flood control is
striking.
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18 An example is the following sentence in Nehru’s Inaugural Address at the Third Session
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East on 1 June 1948:
‘‘… We have these big river valley schemes which in addition to irrigating land,
preventing floods, soil erosion and malaria control, will produce a very great deal of
hydro-electric power and at the same time we will have industrial development.’’
19 Thus, for Hall, identities (the plural) are ‘‘… never unified; … never singular but
multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and agnostic, discourses,
practices, and positions’’ (Hall, 2000, p. 17).
20 See Appiah (2001).
21 See Schick (1997, pp. 118–122). Schick uses fellowship instead of friendship or love
and defines it thus: ‘‘A person is moved by fellowship where what he does is socially
grounded and he sees it in terms of the wantings, the values, or certain others. He not
only wants to do what these others want him to do (or want someone to do) and thinks
he is doing that, but he sees what he is doing as what these others want done’’ (1997,
p. 119).
22 Details of the dispute are discussed in Iyer (1999), Salman (2002) and Anand (2004b).
See Appendix A for a short summary.
23 The other two riparian states are Kerala and Pondichery.
24 Government of Karnataka (n.d., 2002, 2003).
25 Approximately 2000 deaths per annum in Karnataka are said to be suicides. However,
suicide among farmers in Karnataka appears to be mainly related to debts and financial
crises (Menon, 2003). The Expert Committee on Investigating into Causes of Suicides
by Farmers, set up by the Government of Karnataka in its 2002 report, identified
alcohol, family problems and poverty as the three main causes of suicide.
26 1 TMC foot51000 million cubic feet527 million cubic metres.
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Appendix A. The emergence of the Cauvery dispute
It is possible to identify five phases in the development of the dispute:
(1) Planning (up to the year 1892): Irrigation is not new to the Cauvery
region. However, during the period between 1860 and 1892, plans to
develop ‘modern’ irrigation systems by building dams were being
developed. Some of the area in present-day Karnataka was within the
British Madras Presidency and some of the area was under the
administration of Maharaja of Mysore. However, in cropping patterns
and irrigation, there was not much difference.
(2) Dam building (1892–1924): A first agreement between the provincial
governments of Madras (under the British) and Mysore was reached
in 1892 and discussions continued as plans began to be finalised for
Mettur Dam project (now in Tamil Nadu) and Krishna Raja Sagar
project (now in Karnataka). A further agreement with detailed
arrangements for river water flows was developed through discus-
sions from 1910 onwards and was finally reached in 1924.
(3) Putting words to work (1924–1974): Co-operative use of river waters
was facilitated by the 1924 agreement. However, the agreement was
due for review after 50 years.
(4) From disagreement to dispute (1974–1990): Discussions between
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu during the 1960s and 1970s did not
produce an agreement. According to Guhan, between 1968 and 1990,
there were 26 ministerial meetings concerning the Cauvery river
(1993, p. 29); 5 of these were bilateral meetings between Karnataka
and Tamil Nadu and 21 were tripartite meetings involving the Union
Minister for irrigation as well. He also notes (p. 34) that while some
progress was made on technical proposals during 1972–76, these
technical discussions did not result in political agreement. According
to him, when the government of India played a mediating role as in
1972–76 period, an agreement seemed more likely. By 1981, the
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claims from the riparian states became quite divergent. The
government of Karnataka claimed 465 TMCft of water; Kerala claimed
another 100 TMCft; Pondichery’s claims were for 10 TMCft. This adds
up to 575 TMCft. Government of Tamil Nadu wanted the flows to be
in accordance with the 1892 and 1924 agreements. In its view, the
existing utilisation suggested that the total amount of Cauvery water
used was 748 TMCft; of which Tamil Nadu (including Pondichery)
used 566 TMCft; Karnataka used 177 TMCft and Kerala used 5 TMCft.
By the late 1980s, successive years of drought increased water stress
and this may have contributed to hardening of positions by both
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu states. In the absence of agreement, in
1986, government of Tamil Nadu requested the federal government
to constitute a tribunal under Inter-State Water Dispute Act, 1956.
(5) A court to decide (1990 to date): The Cauvery Tribunal was constitute
in June 1990 and the tribunal gave its interim award in January 1991.
The interim award stipulated Karnataka to release 205 TMCft of water
to Tamil Nadu. There were riots mainly in Karnataka and in the
violence some 25 lives were lost. Since then proceedings before the
tribunal have continued. The tribunal’s term is due to be completed
in August 2006. In April 2006, two members of the Tribunal issued a
majority ruling requiring that each of the states submits details of
actual water allocations within a proposed upper limit and that an
expert panel is constituted. The proposal has since been dropped but
now the reports of the assessors have been made public. These
reports assumed total average quantity of water available to be 740
TMCft and of this they suggested allocation as follows: 395 TMCft for
Tamil Nadu; 250 TMCft for Karnataka; 33.4 TMCft for Kerala; and 7
TMCft for Pondichery. Both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have
expressed disagreement with these reports. All four states are
requesting that the tribunal give its final award soon.
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